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CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
PFIAB
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OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27 - 28, 1962.

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
<u>December 27th</u>		
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Review of Board's Draft Interim Report to the President
3.	10:00 - 12:45	Review of Draft Report on Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup (Received from DCI on December 26, 1962)
4.	12:45	Depart for Lunch
5.	1:00 - 2:30	Lunch - The Bay-Adams Hotel (Guests of Dr. Longer)
6.	2:30 - 3:30	Review of the World Situation <i>Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA (Deputy Director CIA-1B)</i>
7.	3:30 - End of Day	Resume Review of Report on Cuban Arms Buildup
8.	7:30 p.m.	Dinner at Residence of Mr. John McCone (3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.) <i>Canceled by all CIA officials except Director, CIA and CIA-1B</i>
<u>December 28th</u>		
9.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
10.	9:30 - 1:00	Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup with the Following Key Intelligence Community Officials: a. 9:30-10:30 ✓ Mr. John McCone b. 10:30-11:00 ✓ Lt. General M. Carter, Deputy Director, CIA c. 11:00-11:30 ✓ Lt. General G. Blake, Director, NSA d. 11:30-12:00 ✓ Mr. Thomas Hughes, Deputy Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State e. 12:00-1:00 ✓ Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director, DIA

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(December 26th - Continued)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>
11.	1:00 - 2:30 2:30 - 3:45	Lunch - Room 21, Executive Office Building McGeorge Leary & Don Parrott
12.	2:30 - 3:30	Status of Implementation of Prior-Board Recommendations Mr. Russell Ash
13.	3:30 - END	Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of Report to the President.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962

The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelligence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the discussions which the Board would have on the following day with heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.

Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr. McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelligence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that the Board is going into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting.

* Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

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24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intelligence on Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the present time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is conducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board. The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypothetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sanitized version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of the Congress.

Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to intelligence handling.

On the question of availability of Special Group records for purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that certainly the Board should examine such records and that they could be obtained from Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that the Board is the only group which can have this kind of access).

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As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that the Board should include in its review discussions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report.

Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.

With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One other matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.

(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:

USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute, and an open break in party relations is most likely near.

USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.

USSR/Berlin: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin, and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.

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The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was taking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations under way.

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cuba crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any interference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave -- and Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur it will be necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption of low-level flights.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba. He would like to see a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in-

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fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of [redacted] representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful intelligence from [redacted] and (5) possibly [redacted]

[redacted] the obtaining of useful information from [redacted] with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U.S. intelligence officer.

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U.S. evacuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. McCone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules. [redacted]

Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base -- Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy decision was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guantamano Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a re-study of the proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr. McCone confirmed that we are conducting [redacted] and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that [redacted] only recently added two more positions there.

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Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.

With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U. S. missile superiority.

Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence.

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